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I. INTRODUCTION
Death is a certainty that is the inevitable result of the human con-
dition. One's death has a profound effect on the living in both its
obvious emotional impact as well as important financial ramifications.
1
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As one passes on, and, presumably, has no further need for the mate-
rial wealth that one has accumulated over the course of a lifetime, the
law steps in to regulate and control what happens to the assets of a
decedent. It is this area of "probate law" that serves as mankind's
answer to problems created by something beyond its control.
In a decision affecting the sphere of probate law as well as that of
constitutional law, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia ad-
dressed the notice due to named beneficiaries under a probated will in
Cary v. Riss.' Decided in the form of two certified questions from the
Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Cary essentially stands for three
propositions that will have a profound effect on the probate of wills in
West Virginia: (1) the requirement under West Virginia statutory law
that the county clerk notify beneficiaries under a will "by mail or
otherwise"2 will be construed to ensure actual notice; (2) receipt of
actual notice by a beneficiary under a will satisfies due process re-
quirements; and (3) neither due process nor any West Virginia statute
requires that a beneficiary, having received actual notice of a will's
delivery to the county clerk, must also receive actual notice of the
county commission's refusal to probate the will.
3
The holding of Cary so changes the day-to-day operation of pro-
bate law in West Virginia that its true effects may not be known for
some time. While many attorneys appreciate a "bright-line" rule with
regard to the requirements of a frequently encountered area such as
probate, there is clearly a lack of direction as to the manner in which
many counties are going to implement a new procedure that arguably
increases the burden on the county significantly in order to comply
with the requirements of the decision. The purpose of this Comment is
to (1) examine the requirements of notice to named beneficiaries under
a will in light of the Cary decision; (2) discuss whether the court's
approach went far enough in its protection of due process concerns in
the probate process; (3) analyze the impact of the decision on West
Virginia's county clerks; and (4) provide a model for use by the coun-
ty clerks to comply with the requirements of Cary.
1. 433 S.E.2d 546 (W. Va. 1993).
2. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-2 (1982).
3. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 552-53.
[Vol. 98:687
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
A proper treatment of the relevant probate issues involved in the
Cary decision begins with an analysis of probate procedure in West
Virginia. The United States Supreme Court decided long ago that pro-
bate would be an area of law left to state statutory regulation.' Thus,
it is important to be aware of the West Virginia's statutory scheme for
the probate of wills. As a starting point, West Virginia Code Section
41-5-1 provides that:
A person having custody of a will shall, within thirty days after the death
of the testator is known to him, deliver such will to the clerk of the coun-
ty [commission] having jurisdiction of the probate thereof, or to the execu-
tor named in the will, who shall offer it for probate, or deliver it to the
clerk, within a reasonable time.'
After a will is presented to the county clerk, the clerk is then required
to "notify by mail or otherwise the executor and the beneficiaries
named in the will, of such delivery .... . 6 The will then remains in
the county clerk's office until proceedings begin for the probate of the
will.
7
A. Probate In Solemn Form
West Virginia law provides for two procedures of probate: probate
in solemn form' and ex parte probate? The county commission" has
4. In Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883), the United States Supreme Court
stated that "the original probate, of course, is mere matter of State regulation, and depends
entirely upon the local law; for it is that law which confers the power of making wills, and
prescribes the conditions upon which alone they may take effect; ... .
See also Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 549 n.6 (affirming this tradition).
5. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-1 (1982). According to the West Virginia court in In re
Hawley's Estate, 189 S.E. 801 (W. Va. 1950), the "Revisers" of the 1931 Code included
this provision as a recognition of the duty of a person who has knowledge of his nomina-
tion as executor of a will to the testator of that will.
6. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-2 (1982).
7. Id.
8. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-5 (1982).
9. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-10 (1982).
10. The county commission was formerly known as the county court, which explains
1996]
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probate jurisdiction under both forms.1 Probate in solemn form re-
quires that, after a testator dies, an interested person must file a veri-
fied petition with the county commission stating: (1) the location and
date of death of the testator; (2) the testator's last residence; (3) the
nature of the testator's estate; and (4) the relationship to the testator
and known addresses of all heirs, beneficiaries under the will, and the
spouse, if surviving.' The county clerk will then issue and serve pro-
cess upon all interested parties, requiring them to appear and show
cause why the will should be refused probate. 3 Before a probate or-
der is entered, any interested party may contest a will, by filing a
notice of contest with the clerk.1" Ultimately, the county commission
will enter an order either admitting the will to probate or refusing to
admit the will. 5
B. Ex Parte Probate
1 6
Alternatively, in an ex parte 7 probate proceeding, the probate of
the references to the former name in the West Virginia Code. See Christopher J. Winton &
Mark W. Kelley, Laying Claim: A Practitioner's Guide to Will Contests in West Virginia,
96 W. VA. L. REV. 123, 125 n.3 (1993).
11. W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 11; W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6; W. VA. CODE § 7-
1-3 (Supp. 1993).




16. The vast majority of wills that are probated in West Virginia are probated under
this procedure. Interview with Bruce L. Stout, Partner, Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter and
Copen, in Huntington, W. Va. (Aug. 3, 1995).
17. The court in Cary footnoted a Comment which offers a "concise explanation of
the history of probate in common form, stating:
In seventeenth century England, the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over the
administration of the personal estates of deceased persons. Under the practice of
those courts, the Ordinary possessed authority to probate wills[.] ...A will could
be admitted to probate before the Ordinary either in common form or solemn
form. Common form was an ex parte proceeding, consisting of the executor's pre-
sentation of the will -and his testifying that it was duly executed by the decedent.
No notice was given of the proceeding and it was essentially an administrative
function, speedily accomplished. English law provided a thirty year period during
which the probate could be contested by interested persons. When a caveat was
presented, the probate of the will was contested in a formal hearing in solemn
690 [Vol. 98:687
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a will may be had without notice to any party.18 After the county
clerk either admits or refuses to admit a will for probate, that decision
is subject to confirmation by the county commission upon its next
regular session.' 9 Under the ex parte probate statute, although not enti-
tled to notice, any person entitled to contest the probate of a will may
object to a will's probate before the clerk of the court makes his or
her determination or before the county commission enters an order
confirming the action of the clerk of the court.20 If anyone wishes to
contest an order by the county commission admitting or refusing to
admit a will to probate, she or he is given statutory authority to appeal
the commission's order to the circuit court.21 Additionally, any person
form wherein citations were issued to heirs, legatees, and devisees. This procedure
was carried to American colonies and was employed in the system of probate
courts which came to be established in the states. The distinction between probate
in common form and solemn form has been preserved in several states up to the
present day and differs little from the procedures before the Ordinaries in England.
Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 549-50 n.7 (citing Nolan W. Carson, Comment, Probate Proceedings -
Administration of Decedents' Estates - The Mullane Case and Due Process of Law, 50
MICH. L. REv. 124, 129-30 (1951) (footnotes omitted)).
18. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-10 (1982) (Providing in pertinent part:
At, or at any time after, the production of a will, any person may move the coun-
ty [commission] having jurisdiction, or the clerk thereof in the vacation of the
[commission], for the probate of such will and the [commission] or the clerk there-
of, as the case may be, may without notice to any party, proceed to hear and
determine the motion and admit the will to probate, or reject the same. The pro-
bate of, or refusal to probate, any will, so made by the clerk, shall be reported to
the [commission] at its next regular session, and, if no objection be made thereto,
and none appear to the [commission], the [commission] shall confirm the
same . . . . [T]he only notice to the parties interested or process against them
required in such case shall be upon the notice of the contest.).
19. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-10 (1982).
20. Id.
21. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-7 (Supp. 1994) (Stating:
Any person feeling himself aggrieved by any order or judgment of the county
commission admitting or refusing to admit any will to probate may, within three
months . . . file his petition in the circuit court of such county, or before the
clerk thereof, appealing to the circuit court from such order or judgment . .. .)
Note that at the time of the Cary decision, Section 41-5-7 allowed the aggrieved
party eight months to file a petition appealing the county commission's decision.
However, note also that the court recognizes that under In re Winzenrith's Will, 55
S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1949), there may also be an appeal under Section 41-5-7 to the circuit
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interested in a will but who was not a party to the ex parte probate
proceeding may file a "bill in equity" to impeach or establish a will
within six months23 after the date of the county commission's order
admitting or refusing to admit the will to probate. 4
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bernhard M. Dennis died on October 27, 1980, at the age of
91.25 By his Last Will and Testament, dated November 9, 1963,26
22. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 550 n.10 (noting that under Rule 2 of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure, "all procedural distinctions between actions, suits and other judicial
proceedings at law or in equity and in the forms of actions are abolished").
23. Note that at the time of the Cary decision, Section 41-5-11 allowed a party inter-
ested in a will who was not a party to the ex parte proceeding two years to file a bill in
equity to impeach or establish a will. Subsequently, this provision has been amended twice:
once in 1993, which shortened the time period from two years to one year, and again in
1994, in which the period was shortened from one year to six months. See W. VA. CODE
§ 41-5-11 (Supp. 1993 & Supp. 1994).
24. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-11 (Supp. 1994) (Stating:
After a judgment or order entered ... in a proceeding for probate ex parte, any
person interested who was not a party to the proceeding, or any person who was
not a party to a proceeding for probate in solemn form, may proceed by complaint
to impeach or establish the will, on which complaint, if required by any party, a
trial by jury shall be ordered, to ascertain whether any, and if any, how much, of
what was so offered for probate, be the will of the decedent . . . . If the judg-
ment or order was entered by the circuit court on appeal from the county commis-
sion, such complaint shall be filed within six months from the date thereof, and if
the judgment or order was entered by the county commission and there was no
appeal therefrom, such complaint shall be filed within six months from the date of
such order of the county commission . . ).
Note that in addition to changing the impeachment period from one year to six
months (see supra note 23), the 1994 amendment of Section 41-5-11 also followed the lan-
guage of the 1993 amendment, which substituted "complaint' for "bill in equity," and
"county commission" for "county court." W. VA. CODE § 41-5-11 (Supp. 1993 & Supp.
1994).
25. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 548.
26. Bernhard Dennis' 1963 will provided in pertinent part:
I hereby will and bequeath to my wife: Sherlie Faye Dennis, all my real and per-
sonal property, for her use and benefit during the term of her natural life.
I direct that all my debts and funeral expenses be paid promptly.
6
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Mr. Dennis bequeathed all of his property to his surviving wife,
Sherlie F. Dennis." The clerk of the Jefferson County Commission
admitted the 1963 will to probate on November 6, 1980, and the ad-
mission was subsequently approved by the Jefferson County Commis-
sion. 8 However, on November 19, 1980, Mildred Dennis Cary, who
is Mr. Dennis's niece and the plaintiff in Cary, offered a second will
into probate which was executed by Mr. Dennis in August of 1980,29
while he was hospitalized in Martinsburg, West Virginia.
Under the second will, Mr. Dennis created a life estate in his wife,
with the remainder to Ms. Cary." The Jefferson County clerk record-
ed the will, but refused to admit it to probate32 on the ground that
witnesses of the second will did not attest to the fact that Mr. Dennis
was of "sound sense and memory" when he signed the will.33 The
I appoint, Sherlie Faye Dennis, Executrix of this will and direct that she administer
without the necessity of entering a bond of security.
Brief of the Plaintiff at 4, Cary v. Riss, 433 S.E.2d 546 (W. Va. 1993) (No. 21562) [here-
inafter Plaintiff's Brief].
27. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 548.
28. Id.
29. Bernhard Dennis's purported second will provided in pertinent part:
FIRST: I direct my Executor hereinafter named to pay all of my just debts and all
other expenses and costs with which my estate may be chargeable as soon as prac-
ticable after my death.
SECOND: I give and devise unto my wife, Shirley Turner Dennis, a life interest
in and to my house and the adjoining lot on Filmore Street in Harpers Ferry for
the remainder of her natural life, and upon her death, the remainder unto Mildred
D. Cary.
THIRD: All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, both real and
personal and wherever situated, I give, devise and bequeath unto my wife, Shirley
Turner Dennis.
FOURTH: I hereby nominate, constitute and appoint the Bank of Harpers Ferry as
Executor of this my Last Will and Testament.
Plaintiff's Brief at 4, Cary v. Riss, 433 S.E.2d 546 (W. Va. 1993) (No. 21562).
30. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 548.
31. Id.
32. The Cary court noted that under Section 41-5-17, "wills are recorded by the coun-
ty clerk when they are admitted to probate." 433 S.E.2d at 548. Thus, the court was per-
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county clerk's refusal to probate the will was never presented to the
county commission for confirmation.34
On February 7, 1981, Mrs. Dennis, the beneficiary under the 1963
will, sold the property that she received under Mr. Dennis's will to
Frederic D. Riss, the defendant in the Cary decision.35 Mr. Riss re-
ceived the property under a general warranty deed and had continued
to own and possess the property from the time he had purchased the
property from Mrs. Dennis in 1981.36 Mrs. Dennis died in 1986 and
three years later Ms. Cary initiated a civil action to revoke the 1963
will and to recognize the 1980 will as the Last Will and Testament of
Bernhard Dennis.37 Ms. Cary also sought an action in ejectment to
remove Mr. Riss from the property that Mr. Riss had purchased from
Mrs. Dennis and had possessed since 1981.38
At a pretrial conference early in the civil action, Mr. Riss moved
to dismiss the case because Ms. Cary had not appealed the clerk's
refusal to admit the 1980 will to probate within eight months39 of the
refusal.4" Mr. Riss also moved for dismissal on the grounds that Ms.
Cary failed to initiate proceedings to impeach the 1963 will within the
two-year 4' statute of limitations.42 Ms. Cary argued that the pertinent
provisions of the West Virginia Code, as applied, deprived her of due
process by not ensuring her notice of the probate proceedings. 4 3 The
34. Section 41-5-10 requires that the refusal or admission of a will to probate by the
clerk of a county commission be confirmed by the county commission as a proper action.
See also supra note 13 and accompanying text.




39. At the time Cary was decided, Section 41-5-7 required that any person who
wished to appeal either the county clerk's admission or refusal to admit a will to probate
had to do so within eight (8) months after the clerk's action. See supra note 24.
40. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 548.
41. At the time of the Cary decision, Section 41-5-11 set forth a two-year statute of
limitations for the initiation of proceedings to impeach a disputed will. See supra note 24.
42. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 548.
43. The court in Cary noted that the facts in this case are unusual in that Ms. Cary,
while raising the issue of failure to give notice, is not only a beneficiary under the 1980
will, but also the person who submitted it to probate. Thus, the "merit of her assertion" that
she was deprived of due process was questioned, as she "clearly had notice of the pendency
[Vol. 98:687
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circuit court then requested that a set of certified questions be submit-
ted to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia and directed
that the parties file a joint motion for certification. 4' The circuit court
entered an order certifying the following questions to the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia:
(1) Do the requirements of due process make it necessary that notice be
given to the beneficiary under a will that has been refused probate, but
that has been recorded45 by the Clerk of the County Commission? [;and]
(2) If so, does the failure to give such notice operate so as to toll the
statutes of limitation"' until such notice or knowledge of such refusal to
admit to probate is gained by said beneficiary?"'
IV. THE DECISION
One of the many functions of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia is to grant relief, through the process of certification, by
accepting and deciding questions of law48 that circuit courts submit to
the court.49 The Cary decision was the court's response to two certi-
fied questions from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County.50 Justice
McHugh delivered the opinion of the court.
of the exparte probate proceedings." Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 553.
44. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 548.
45. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted that although the term "re-
corded" was used by the circuit court in referring to the 1980 will, the term was not rele-
vant to the court's decision of the certified question and, therefore, would be omitted from
their discussion of the issue. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 548 n.2.
46. Referring to the statutes of limitations found in Sections 41-5-7 and -11.
47. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 548.
48. Under Section 58-5-2, the jurisdiction of the court is expressly limited to questions
of law. See Leishman v. Bird, 128 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1963). See also State v. Stout, 95
S.E.2d 639 (W. Va. 1956) (holding that the court has no jurisdiction to determine a ques-
tion of fact on certificate).
49. W. VA. CODE § 58-5-2 (1966) (describing the certification process). The process is
further outlined in Rule 13 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.
50. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 548.
19961
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A. Certified Question One
In responding to the first certified question, the court was primari-
ly charged with the task of determining whether due process requires
that actual notice be given to a named beneficiary under a will that
has been refused probate by the county clerk.5 The will advanced by
Ms. Cary was probated pursuant to the ex parte procedure,52 which
Mr. Riss argued did not require any notice by the clerk or the county
commission in either admitting or refusing a will for probate. 3 On
the other hand, MYs. Cary argued to the court that due process requires
actual notice, and that the then current ex parte probate procedure54
violated her right to due process.55
After summarizing the probate procedure in West Virginia,56 the
court moved quickly into its decision. Essential to the court's determi-
nation of the type of notice which must be given to named beneficia-
ries under a will were two United States Supreme Court decisions:
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 7 and Tulsa Profes-
sional Collection Services v. Pope.58
In Mullane, "the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company in New
York petitioned For a judicial settlement of accounts which would be
binding upon everyone having any interest in a common trust fund that
it had established under Section 100-(c) of the New York Banking
Law.59 In the common trust fund,6 ° the company invested assets of
51. Id. at 549.
52. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-10 (1982).
53. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 549.
54. W. VA. CODE §§ 41-5-10, -11 (1982) (outlining the then current ex parte probate
procedure). For the current ex parte procedure, see supra notes 18 and 24 and accompany-
ing text.
55. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 26, at 17 (citing the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of Article 3, Section 10 of the
West Virginia Constitution, both of which state that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the judgment of his peers").
56. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 549-50.
57. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
58. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
59. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309.
60. Id. at 308 (Citing New York Banking Law Section 110-c as the relevant statutory
[Vol. 98:687
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several trusts of which it was trustee and of which some of the benefi-
ciaries were residents and some nonresidents of the State of New
York." The only notice that was given of the proceedings was the
notice given via publication in a local newspaper in "strict compliance
with the minimum requirements" 2 of state law. 3
The impetus for the litigation in Mullane occurred when a benefi-
ciary under one of the trusts, which had been co-mingled in the com-
mon fund, failed to receive notice of the judicial settlement of accounts
through the publication and, much like Ms. Cary, brought an action to
protect his interests.6 The beneficiary made a special appearance and
objected that the notice provided by the statutory provisions at issue65
was inadequate to afford due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.6 The United States Supreme Court noted:
[A]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any pro-
ceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.67
authorization for the creation of such a trust fund. Under the statute, a trust company can
establish a common fund and invest the assets of trusts or other funds of which it is
trustee, with approval of the New York State Banking Board.).
61. Id. at 309.
62. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c(12) (1975). The statute further provides:
After filing such petition [for judicial settlement of the trust account] the petitioner
shall cause to be issued by the court in which the petition is filed and shall pub-
lish not less than once in each week for four successive weeks in a newspaper to
be designated by the court a notice or citation addressed generally without naming
them to all parties interested in such common trust fund and in such estates, trusts,
or funds mentioned in the petition, all of which may be described in the notice or
citation only in the manner set forth in said petition and without setting forth the
residence of any such decedent or donor of any such estate, trust or fund.
Id.
63. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309.
64. Id at 311.
65. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c (1975).
66. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311.
67. Id. at 314 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean,
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Thus the majority of the United States Supreme Court held that
the notice of the judicial settlement of accounts as required by New
York law68 was incompatible with the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for adjudication depriving persons,
who not only were known, but also whose whereabouts were known,
of substantial property rights.69 In a brief dissenting opinion, Justice
Burton argued that a common trust, such as the one at issue in
Mullane, is available only when the instruments creating the trust per-
mit participation in the common fund.70 Justice Burton argued that
whether the notice required by the statute was adequate was, thus, an
issue "properly within the discretion of the State."
7'
After considering Mullane, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia examined the more recent case of Tulsa Professional Collec-
tion Services v. Pope.72 In Tulsa, the United States Supreme Court
examined a nonclaim provision of Oklahoma's Probate Code.73 Under
this provision, creditors' claims against an estate are generally barred
unless presented against the personal representative within two months
of the publication of notice of the commencement of probate proceed-
ings.74 After the death of her husband, JoAnne Pope initiated probate
proceedings in the District Court of Tulsa County as personal repre-
sentative of his will.75 Upon the court's direction that she "immediate-
ly give notice to creditors, ' 76 Ms. Pope published notice in the Tulsa
Daily Legal News for two consecutive weeks beginning July 17, 1979,
advising creditors that they must file any claim that they had against
Mr. Pope's estate within two months of the first publication of the
notice.7
68. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c(12) (1975).
69. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320 (Jackson, J., writing for the majority).
70. Id. (Burton, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 552 (citing Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 478).
73. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 479.
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 333 (1981) (requiring that claims "arising upon a contract"
generally be presented to the executor or executrix of the estate within two months of the
publication of a notice advising creditors of the commencement of probate proceedings).
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Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. (Tulsa Collection Ser-
vices) was the assignee to a claim for medical expenses incurred by
Mr. Pope in his final hospital stay.78 Tulsa Collection Services, a
creditor of Mr. Pope's estate, did not file a claim within the two-
month time period following Ms. Pope's publication of notice." The
aggrieved creditor sought judicial relief from the statutory provisions
and argued, much like Ms. Cary, that the nonclaim statute's notice
provisions violated due process requirements."0 After an extensive
analysis of the scope of its holding in Mullane," and subsequent case
law,82 the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice O'Connor, held that if the identity of a creditor is known or
"reasonably ascertainable,"83 then the Due Process Clause of the Unit-
ed States Constitution requires that the creditor be given "[n]otice by
mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice. 84
It was the United States Supreme Court's focus on due process
concerns that guided the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's
decision in Cary.5 The court focused on the exact interest that a
named beneficiary under a will has in receiving notice of that will's
probate, as a function of determining "how much" due process was
necessary to protect that interest. The court noted that "[c]learly, be-




81. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
82. E.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (affirming that an
intangible interest may be property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Mennonite Bd.
of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (posting and publishing of tax foreclosure sale
notice was insufficient to satisfy due process interests of property owners whose addresses
are reasonably ascertainable); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (holding that
private use of state-sanctioned procedures does not rise to the level of state action, a requi-
site for due process protection); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (holding that
the state's involvement in the mere running of a general statue of limitations is insufficient
to implicate due process).
83. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 482 (citing Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800).
84. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 491 (citing Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800).
85. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia prefaced its examination
of the first certified question by stating that "in responding to the first certified question, we
are mindful of the due process concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Mullane and
Pope." Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 551.
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inquire as to the outcome of probate proceedings. 8 6 Thus, the court's
task became to determine whether the probate system already in place
sufficiently protected this interest.
As the probate procedure in question is statutory in nature, 7 the
court in Cary was required to employ certain rules of statutory con-
struction.8 As a preliminary matter, the court had to resolve an appar-
ent incongruity between West Virginia Code Section 41-5-10,89 which
provides that no notice is required in probating a will, and West Vir-
ginia Code Section 41-5-2,9o which reads to require actual notice be
given to beneficiaries when any will is delivered to the county clerk."
The court began its resolution of the apparent inconsistency with a
recognition of the presumption that when the legislature enacts legisla-
tion, it is familiar with its prior enactments. 92 It next explained that it
is required93 to "give meaning to all provisions in a statutory scheme
and apply them in accordance with the objects of the general system of
the law of which they form a part.
9 4
86. Id. at 551-52.
87. W. VA. CODE §§ 41-5-1 to -20 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
88. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 552.
89. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
90. West Virginia Code Section 41-5-2 (1982) provides:
Upon delivery of a will unto him as provided in the next preceding section
[(§ 41-5-1)], the clerk shall notify by mail or otherwise the executor and the bene-
ficiaries named in the will, of such delivery, and shall keep the same safe in his
office until proceedings may be had for the probate thereof, or until it is demand-
ed by an executor or other person authorized to demand it for the purpose of
having it proved according to law.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing State ex reL Foster v. City of Morgantown, 432 S.E.2d 195 (V. Va.
1993); Hudok v. Board of Educ., 415 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1992)).
93. This rule of statutory construction is well-stated in Syllabus Point 1 of State ex
reL Simpkins v. Harvey, 305 S.E.2d 268 (W. Va. 1983):
A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit, pur-
poses and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a
part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar
with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statu-
tory, or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same
and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms
are consistent therewith.
94. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 552.
[Vol. 98:687
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss2/9
CARYv. RISS
Thus, the court presumed that the West Virginia Legislature rec-
ognized that beneficiaries were entitled to actual notice that a will has
been delivered for probate and, consequently, enacted West Virginia
Code Section 41-5-2 in 1931."5 In a creative fashion, the court then
resolved the apparent incongruity between the two sections by conclud-
ing that there really is no inconsistency, stating:
[T]he language in W.Va. Code, 41-5-10 which states that the county com-
mission may hear and determine probate without giving notice is not in
conflict with the notice requirements of W.Va. Code, 41-5-2 for one sim-
ple reason: the actual notice given to beneficiaries upon delivery of the
will obviates the need for the county commission to give actual notice to
beneficiaries of its action. 6
The court concluded that the two statutory provisions were to be read
together and applied to further the purposes of the probate laws.97
In responding to the first certified question, therefore, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that whenever any will is de-
livered to the county clerk,9" the county clerk is required to notify by
mail or otherwise99 the beneficiaries named under the will.'00 Fur-
thermore, in what is arguably the most important aspect of the Cary
decision, the court held that "[n]otification 'by mail or otherwise' shall
be construed as certain to ensure actual notice." 101 Finally, the court
reasoned that when a beneficiary receives actual notice, due process re-
quirements are satisfied "because beneficiaries have notice that the
testator has died and that probate proceedings will be instituted."'0 2
95. Id. Although it is clear that this has not been the practice since 1931. Telephone
Interview with Bruce L. Stout, Partner, Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter & Copen, in Hun-
tington, W. Va. (Jan. 15, 1996). Accord Telephone Interviews with the county clerk of each
county in West Virginia (conducted between Jan. 16, 1996 and Jan. 25, 1996) [hereinafter
Telephone Interviews with county clerks].
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-1 (1982) (requiring that every will be delivered to the coun-
ty clerk).
99. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-2 (1982).
100. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 552.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 552-53.
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The court held that neither due process nor any West Virginia statutory
authority require that a beneficiary must also be given actual notice of
the county commission's refusal' °3 to probate a will.' 4
B. Certified Question Two
By answering the first certified question in the negative, the court
avoided the need to answer the second question concerning the tolling
of state statutes of limitations.
0 5
V. ANALYSIS
The determination that notification "by mall or otherwise" shall be
construed as certain to ensure actual notice, as an adequate safeguard
of due process rights, leads one to ask whether this decision goes far
enough to protect due process interests. Likewise, one must be con-
cerned as to how the county clerks will implement the Cary notifica-
tion mandate. This Part of the Comment addresses the questions left in
the wake of Caty as well as the impact of the decision on the every-
day practice of probate law in West Virginia.
A. Did the Court Go Far Enough?
The factual scenario of Cary involved a complaint by Ms. Cary,
who was a beneficiary under both a superseded will 6 and the super-
seding will.0 7 It is thus certain that, as a result of Cary, named bene-
ficiaries under a will which is probated are certain to receive actual
103. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-10 (1982).
104. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 553.
105. Id.
106. Under the 1963 will, Mr. Dennis created a life estate in his wife, Sherlie Dennis,
yet did not designate a remainderman. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 548. However, at that time, and
subsequently, Ms. Cary was the only other heir at law of Mr. Dennis. Thus, presumably,
she had an interest even under the 1963 will, by virtue of an interest that would vest by
operation of intestate succession laws.
107. Under the 1980 will, Ms. Cary was expressly designated as remainderman to the
life estate of Ms. Dennis. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 548.
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notice, "by mail or otherwise,' '. of the will's delivery to the county
clerk. Likewise, it is certain that the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mullanel"9
and Tulsa,"' requires that actual notice be given to creditors of an
estate whose name and address are "reasonably ascertainable."'I
However, there are many other parties who have an interest in the
probate of a particular estate, but are not currently given due process
protection because they are neither a named beneficiary under the will
nor a creditor of the estate.
1. Heirs
One such party, who clearly has a pecuniary interest in the probate
of an estate, is an heir who would take part or all of the estate by
intestate succession if the will were to be set aside. The vast majority
of jurisdictions already recognize heirs as persons who have a vested
interest in the probate of a will, as evidenced by the many jurisdictions
holding that an heir who stands to gain a greater share of the testator's
estate by intestate succession than by taking under the will has stand-
ing to pursue a will contest."' The property interest of an heir is
well within the scope of the protection of the Due Process Clauses.'
However, under the current status of West Virginia law, actual notice
108. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-2 (1982).
109. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
110. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., In re Will of Joyner, 242 S.E.2d 213 (N.C. 1977); Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 43 S.E.2d 329 (Ga. 1947); Estate of Molera, 100 Cal. Rptr. 696 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972); Will of Basile, 313 N.Y.S.2d. 513 (N.Y. 1970); Hancock v. Frazier, 86 So. 2d 389
(Ala. 1956).
113. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (providing that a balancing test serve
as the current model for procedural due process). Under Mathews, the United States Su-
preme Court calls for the use of an equation which balances on one side both the strength
of the private interest that would be affected by the proposed state action and "the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." 424 U.S. at 334. On the
other side of the Mathews equation is "the government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail." Id.
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of a will's delivery to the county clerk is not required to be given to
such parties.
Although West Virginia does not currently protect the property
interests of heirs by requiring actual notice, several states do. One state
that has considered the due process concerns of heirs and now requires
that notice be given to heirs of a will's delivery to the county clerk is
Iowa. In 1965, the Iowa legislature enacted Iowa Code Section
633.304, which requires that heirs of an estate receive actual notice by
mail to ensure that they are made aware of the time limitations of the
contest period."4 Explicitly acknowledging the United States Supreme
Court's concern with due process protection, the Supreme Court of
Iowa, in construing Section 633.304, stated that "[c]learly, the purpose
of the legislature's amendment of Section 633.304 is to increase due
process in light of Pope, which only applied to creditors."" 5
A similar conclusion was drawn by the Court of Appeals of Ore-
gon in Lawver v. Beesley. 16 In Lawver, nephews of a decedent
brought an action against the estate's personal representative, claiming
that they had failed to receive the notice due to them under Oregon
Revised Statute Section 113.155."' Although the nephews did receive
notice by publication in a local newspaper, they asserted in their cause
of action that they had been deprived statutory notice." 8 The Oregon
court engaged in extensive statutory construction and held that "pub-
lished notice under ORS 113.155 is intended to afford published notice
to unknown heirs."".9  More importantly, the court held that
"[b]ecause petitioners were known heirs, they should have received
mailed or delivered notice .. ,.2o
Of particular note is a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in
which the court was faced with the situation in which a nonresident
heir had been afforded notice only by publication of the admission of
114. IOWA CODE § 633.304 (1965).
115. Matter of Estate of Weidman, 476 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1991).
116. 740 P.2d 1215 (Or. Ct App. 1987).
117. Id. at 1220.
118. Id. at 1219-20.
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his grandfather's will to probate in a local newspaper and brought an
action to contest the will almost twenty years after the testator's
death.'21 The grandson argued that the current notice provisions of
the Ohio Probate Code were unconstitutional in that they inadequately
protected his due process rights.' Although the court denied that the
petitioner had standing to contest the constitutionality of the statute, the
court pronounced in dictum that:
[T]he constitutionality of notice by publication to resident and nonresident
heirs whose whereabouts are known to the applicant are questionable under
the doctrines announced in Mullane and its progeny.'
Furthermore, the Ohio court issued a subtle invitation to the Ohio
General Assembly to address the due process problem, stating:
In response to Mullane, some states have acted to amend their statutes to
require mailed notice of probate proceedings. The legislatures of other
states have been urged by their courts and the commentators to do like-
wise. The time appears ripe for this issue to receive the attention of the
General Assembly.'24
2. Devisees and Legatees Under Prior Wills
According to West Virginia law, there are a number of ways in
which a prior will of a testator may be given effect and effectively
"republished" over a subsequent will. For instance, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia has addressed and recognized the doctrine
of "dependent relevant revocation," providing:
If a testator obliterates, deletes, or cancels a will, having a present intent
to make a new will as a substitute for the old, and the new will is not
made, it is presumed that the testator preferred the old will to an intestacy
and the first will be given effect."
121. Palazzi v. Estate of Gardner, 512 N.E.2d 971 (Ohio 1987).
122. Id. at 977.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Nelson v. Ratliffe, 69 S.E.2d 217, 218, Syl. Pt. 3 (W. Va. 1952). See also Miller
v. Todd, 447 S.E.2d 9, 14 (W. Va. 1994) (reaflrmning the dependent relevant revocation
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Likewise, a testator may execute a Last Will and Testament and
subsequently execute a revocation of' that will and proffer a second
will in its place. Normally, the first will would be revoked and the
second writing effective. However, if the testator were to be deemed to
be incompetent in executing the second writing, thus invalidating the
document, then the revocation clause of that document would also be
invalidated. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia faced this
exact situation in Miller v. Todd.126 The court acknowledged that "[i]f
Mrs. Todd [testator] lacked the requisite testamentary capacity to exe-
cute the 1986 will, then it follows that she also lacked the 'intent to
revoke' as required by W. Va. Code, 41-1-7 [1923].""' Thus, the
first will of the testator in Miller was recognized as the effective will
and "republished." '
In such situations, it is clear that a party may stand to gain a
share of a testator's estate from the operation of law setting aside a
subsequent will and bringing the prior will into probate. Again, many
jurisdictions have recognized that such a party has standing to contest a
will, thus implying that devisees under a prior will have a significant
property interest.'29 Considering the direct pecuniary gain that a bene-
ficiary under a prior will stands to derive from the outcome of a will's
probate, such a party has a very compelling argument that he or she
deserves actual notice of a will's delivery to the county clerk. Howev-
er, even in the wake of Cary, the county clerk is not required to pro-
vide actual notice to such a party in West Virginia.
At least one jurisdiction has extended due process protection by
actual notice to devisees and legatees under a prior will. In McKnight
v. Boggs,3 ' the Supreme Court of Georgia examined this property
interest and consequent due process protection to which a devisee un-
doctrine).
126. 447 S.E.2d 9 (W. Va. 1994).
127. Id. at 13.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Estate of Powers, 154 Cal. Rptr. 366 (Ct. App. 1979); Thomas v.
Gaines, 165 S.E.2d 883 (Ga. 1969); Wells v. Salyer, 452 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1970); Sigmund
Stemberger Found., Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 161 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. 1968); and Caswell v.
Lerman, 88 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio 1948).
130. 322 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 1984).
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der a prior will was entitled under the existing Georgia Probate
Code.' The Georgia court began its examination with the premise
that "[a]n inchoate interest in real property 'as a devisee under [a] will
is a legally protected interest."' 132 Next the court opined that "[u]nder
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. [(citation ommitted)],
it is clear that due process prohibits deprivation of property without
notice and an opportunity to be heard."'3 The court concluded that:
OCGA section 53-3-13 violates our due process requirement insofar as it
fails to require that notice be given to propounders and beneficiaries of
another purported will of the decedent which has been filed previously for
probate within the same county.'34
3. Disclaimers
Under the West Virginia Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests
Act,'35 a party may "disclaim" property that devolves to him or her
"under a testamentary instrument or by the laws of intestacy"'36 and
allows his or her issue to take the property as if the disclaimant had
predeceased the decedent.'37 The purpose of the disclaimer statute is
"to permit the heir of an intestate decedent to disclaim or renounce his
share of the estate in favor of other heirs or distibutees after the
decedent's death, an act which was not permitted at common law.
138
Often used for tax advantages,'39 disclaimers provide for another
scenario in which a party may have a sufficient property interest to
warrant notice of a will's delivery for probate. Suppose at a decedent's
death, his or her sole child was the sole named beneficiary under the
decedent's will, and three living grandchildren were contingent benefi-
131. Id.
132. Id. at 283 (citing Allan v. Allan, 223 S.E.2d 445 (Ga. 1976)).
133. Id. at 283.
134. Id.
135. W. VA. CODE §§ 42-6-1 to -8 (1982).
136. W. VA. CODE § 42-6-3(a) (1982).
137. W. VA. CODE § 42-6-5 (1982).
138. Webb v. Webb, 301 S.E.2d 570, 574 (W. Va. 1983).
139. Interview with John W. Fisher, II, Professor of Law, West Virginia University
College of Law, in Morgantown, W. Va. (Jan. 12, 1996).
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ciaries. The decedent's child could "disclaim" his or her share of the
decedent's estate: and allow the grandchildren to take the property di-
rectly from the decedent's estate. Thus, the grandchildren, as parties
who have a legitimate, although remote, .interest in the admission of a
decedent's will into probate, may be entitled to have that interest pro-
tected by a requirement that they be notified of the will's admission.
4. The State
The state itself may have a property interest that is not yet pro-
tected by the requirement of actual notice of a will's delivery to the
county clerk. The state is the potential escheator for the property of
citizens who die intestate, and thus has something to gain if the will of
a decedent with no heirs is set aside. Although the county clerk's ac-
ceptance of the will is sufficient for state action in a procedural due
process context, the same may not be sufficient to put the potential
escheator on notice to adequately protect the state's property interest.
The state's property interest is analogous to that of any other intestate
successor in that both parties stand to gain by the operation of the
state's intestacy provisions. It is thus a logical extension that the state
may be entitled to actual notice of a will's delivery to any county
clerk, for the same reasons that any other heir deserves to have his or
her property interests protected.
B. Has West Virginia Been Here Before?
This is not the first time that the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia has considered the protection of due process on one
hand and the resulting burdens imposed on the state entities who must
implement the decision on the other. A similar concern has been ex-
plored with the practical ramifications of the court's mandates in the
area of tax sales of forfeited and delinquent lands. 4 In addressing
140. Two articles in particular explore this area of law and are highly recommended as
excellent references to understand the topic of forfeited and delinquent lands in West Virgin-
ia: John W. Fisher, II, Forfeited and Delinquent Lands - The Unresolved Constitutional
Issue, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 961 (1987) [hereinafter Fisher]; and Carla W. Tanner, Forfeited
and Delinquent Lands: Resolving the Due Process Deficiencies, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 251
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the amount of notice deserved by a delinquent property owner before a
sheriffs sale, 4' the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has
held that the property interest of a beneficiary of a deed of trust war-
rants due process protection.142 Furthermore, the court held that:
Where a party having an interest in the property can reasonably be identi-
fied from public records or otherwise, due process requires that such party
be provided notice by mail or otherwise means as certain to ensure actual
notice . 1...43
The court's holding that "notice by mail or otherwise means as
certain to ensure actual notice" is virtually identical to the central hold-
ing in the Cary decision.'44 The benefit of having such a prior ruling
is that the practical effects of the Lilly decision can be examined as a
foreshadowing of the problems that can be expected with the imple-
mentation of the Cary decision. For example, the Lilly decision has
been criticized because "the court did not explain what level of reason-
ableness is appropriate in a state's attempt to identify an interested
party's name and address."' 45 Likewise, a major criticism of Cary is
that it fails to explain necessary issues such as the manner in which it
is to be implemented.'46
(1993) [hereinafter Tanner].
141. One component of the land sales procedure is a sheriffs sale of delinquent land to
the highest bidder. See W. VA. CODE §§ lIA-3-1 to -44 (1991 & Supp. 1993). For an
excellent overview of the tax sales procedure in West Virginia, see Tanner, supra note 140,
at 253-55; Fisher, supra note 140, at 961-85.
142. Lilly v. Duke, 376 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1988).
143. Lilly, 376 S.E.2d at 125.
144. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
145. Tanner, supra note 140, at 265.
146. However, in her dissenting opinion in Mennonite, Justice O'Connor argued that:
Without knowing what state and individual interests will be at stake in future cas-
es, the Court espouses a general principle ostensibly applicable whenever any legal-
ly protected property interest may be adversely affected. . . . The Court, citing
Mullane, now holds that constructive notice can never suffice whenever there is a
legally protected property interest at stake.
462 U.S. 791, 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor was concerned about such a "broad ruling," noting that the major-
ity of the Court:
[]gnor[ed] the fact that it is the totality of the circumstances that determines the
sufficiency of notice [and that the Court also] neglects to consider that the consti-
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Perhaps realizing the open-endedness of its mandate in Lilly, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has fortunately made ef-
forts to pronounce limits on the state's duty to notify delinquent prop-
erty owners in the context of forfeited and delinquent lands. In Citizens
National Bank v. Dunnaway,"1 ' the court "clarified Lilly a step fur-
ther ... setting a standard of reasonableness by which to judge a
state's efforts in ascertaining an interested party's name and ad-
dress." 4 The real import of Dunnaway is not that it is a landmark
case in tax sales law, but rather that the case evidences that the court
is both aware of real impracticabilities that arise from its decisions and
willing to "establish[] parameters against which to gauge tax authorities
efforts toward due process." '49
The court's willingness to address the need for parameters will
hopeflly motivate the court to follow Cary with a subsequent case
much like it did to Lilly with Dunnaway.
C. Implementation of "Actual Notice" Under Cary
The decision that notification "by mail or otherwise" under West
Virginia Code Section 41-5-2 "shall be construed as certain to ensure
actual notice,"'' 0 represents a drastic change in the practical aspects
of probate in West Virginia. Prior to the court's decision in Cary, the
usual probate practice in West Virginia was that beneficiaries were
often afforded no notice of a will's delivery to a county clerk.'
Thus, there was no certain protection whatsoever of the property rights
of named beneficiaries under a will.
tutional obligation on the state may itself be defined by the party's ability to pro-
tect its interest.
Id.
147. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Dunnaway, 400 S.E.2d 888 (W. Va. 1990).
148. Tanner, supra note 140, at 271.
149. Id.
150. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 552.
151. Telephone Interviews with county clerks, supra note 95.
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1. Problems With Implementation
Explicit in the court's decision in Cary was the requirement that
actual notice was thereafter required to be afforded to named benefi-
ciaries under a will.'52 The court did not, however, delineate any pro-
cedures by which the county clerk's were to effectuate this actual no-
tice to named beneficiaries under a will. In many instances, the task
could be completed simply by resort to a local directory or tax re-
cords.' However, there will inevitably be situations in which the ad-
dress of a named beneficiary will be impossible to determine or ascer-
tainable only through an exhaustive inquiry.
The problem with imposing such a requirement on the West Vir-
ginia county clerks is that some counties are inevitably more rural in
nature or have less tax revenues with which to operate. As a result, the
court's decision in Cary may have a disproportionate impact on various
counties within the state based on individualized procedures already in
place and monetary resources at their disposal. For instance, those
counties who have a more extensive probate system will have more
staff personnel as well as the monetary resources to facilitate notice to
the named beneficiaries under a will. One county employee related a
recent experience in which her office received a will with over forty
named beneficiaries." 4 Between "postage, costs, and our time," she
found the process to considerably burden the office and described it
more succinctly as "a nightmare."'55 The county clerk of a more rural
West Virginia county explained that his office had only two employees
for clerical tasks, who were already too "overworked and underpaid" to
implement yet another task.'56 Perhaps the true effect of Cary on
county probate proceedings in West Virginia will not be clear until
each county's response to the new requirements can be examined.
152. Id.
153. These records are also usually in the possession of the county clerk.
154. Telephone Interview with Ms. McCord, Head of Probate Department, Harrison
County Clerk's Office (Jan. 22, 1996).
155. Id.
156. Telephone Interview with anonymous county clerk (Jan. 22, 1996).
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2. A Statewide Poll - The Problem Realized
Between January 16, 1996 and January 25, 1996, the author con-
ducted a survey of all of West Virginia's fifty-five (55) counties to
determine the counties' current practice regarding the notice given to
named beneficiaries under a probated will. The author began the survey
by creating three groups into which the current practice of every coun-
ty must necessarily fall: (1) those counties who still do not give actual
notice to named beneficiaries (Group 1); (2) those counties who have
begun to give actual notice to named beneficiaries within the last year
(Group 2); and (3) those counties who have been giving actual notice
for more than one year (Group 3). Upon contacting the county clerks
of each county, the results were as follows:
Group 1 - 25 counties - 45.46%
Group 2 - 23 counties - 41.82%
Group 3 - 7 counties - 12.72%
a. Group One Counties
The most persuasive evidence that there is a problem with the
practical implementation of the court's holding in Cary is that close to
one-half of the counties still do not comply with the court's holding
some two-and-a-half years later. The overwhelming response of the
clerks of the Group 1 counties as to why they were affording no no-
tice, in violation of Cary, was that they had never heard of such a
requirement.157 There is clearly a communication breakdown between
the court and the clerks. The second most frequently cited reason for
non-compliance with Cary was a lack of staffing and/or funding to
undertake the notification required. 5 '
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b. Group Two Counties
Fortunately, a sizable portion of West Virginia's counties have
implemented a notification procedure within the last year so as to com-
ply with the Cary decision. Invariably, the overwhelming majority of
Group 2 counties credited Huntington attorney Bruce L. Stout'59 as
the reason behind their implementation of a notification procedure.'60
Mr. Stout addressed the West Virginia Association of Circuit and
County Clerks at its August 1995 assembly in Huntington, West Vir-
ginia."' At the conclusion of his address, Mr. Stout commented on
the Cary requirement that county clerks give actual notice to named
beneficiaries under a probated will and stated his impression that the
court's ruling was not being observed in the majority of West Virginia
counties. 162
c. Group Three Counties
Only seven of West Virginia's counties have been in compliance
with the holding of Cary for more than one year. These counties credit
their punctuality in compliance on a number of motivations including a
capsulized positivist belief ("It's the law, you know"'63) as well as an
equally concise naturalist philosophy ("I've always done it because I
think it is the right thing to do"'64). Regardless of what prompted
these counties, their sheer minority attests to the fact that, for whatever
reason, the laws are not flowing freely from the court to the county
governments.
159. Partner, Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter and Copen, Huntington, W. Va.
160. Telephone Interviews with county clerks, supra note 95.
161. Telephone Interviews with county clerks, supra note 95. Accord Telephone Inter-
view with Bruce L. Stout (Jan. 15, 1996).
162. Telephone Interviews with county clerks, supra note 95. In fact, many of the
county clerks expressed their gratitude that Mr. Stout had made them aware of their court-
imposed duty and their displeasure that they had not been afforded notice of their duty until
two years after the Cary decision and solely because of the thoroughness of one member of
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia decided in Cary
v. Riss'6 5 that the statute 66 requiring the county clerk to notify
named beneficiaries under a will "'by mail or otherwise' shall be con-
strued as certain to ensure actual notice," and furthermore, that such
actual notice satisfied due process requirements. 67 The court's deci-
sion issued an explicit mandate to the counties regarding the manner in
which probate proceedings are required to be undertaken. In doing so,
the court has balanced the property interests of named beneficiaries
under a will and the resulting administrative burdens that have been
forced upon the counties. In this instance, the court found that con-
cerns for the potential deprivation of property rights by a system that
does not afford actual notice of a will's delivery outweighed any bur-
den(s) that the new system might impose. Although the court found
this balancing test to weigh decidedly in favor of ensuring actual no-
tice, its decision stopped short of supplying the counties with sugges-
tions for implementing its decision. Thus, the burden of having to now
afford actual notice to named beneficiaries under a will is, in effect,
compounded by the additional task of having to formulate some sort of
administrative system in which to perform the court's mandate with no
guidance whatsoever.
Additionally, the court's commitment to protecting due process
rights under the probate procedure noticeably omitted an extension of
protection to, or even a discussion of, other parties who have, argu-
ably, property rights that are just as deserving of protection. Whether
the party is an heir who would gain property over a will by intestacy,
a devisee or legatee under a prior will, an assignee of an heir or bene-
ficiary, or the State of West Virginia itself, there are clearly other
parties who stand to gain from the probate or refusal to probate a will,
and whose property interest is not extended protection by the Cary
decision. With an opportunity to establish the exact due process con-
165. 433 S.E.2d 546.
166. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-2 (1982).
167. Cary, 433 S.E.2d at 552.
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cerns that would be protected by the relevant provisions of the West
Virginia Code on probate proceedings, it is somewhat disappointing
that the court left unresolved so many pertinent questions in an area of
law that, by its nature and topic, requires a very clear understanding
by West Virginia practicing attorneys.
Chad S. Lovejoy"
* The author wishes to express his sincere thanks to Mr. Bruce L. Stout, Partner, of
Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter & Copen, Huntington, W. Va. and Professor John W.
Fisher, II, of the West Virginia University College of Law, for their help and guidance in
the preparation of this article.
19961
29
Lovejoy: Cary v. Riss: Protecting Due Process Concerns in West Virginia Pr
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Appendix
Many of the county clerks that were contacted by phone for the
survey included in this Comment expressed an overwhelming level of
concern that they had no idea of how to comply with the notice re-
quirements of Cary v. Riss. In order to provide a model for county
officials who want to implement such a procedure, the following form
should serve as a model for notice to named beneficiaries under a
probated will. The form was submitted by the office of Ben A. Bagby,
Clerk of the Cabell County Commission. Its brevity and clarity attest
that compliance may be possible without an undue burden on the coun-
ties of West Virginia.
The Cabell (County Clerk currently uses two forms to comply with
the notice requirements of Cary v. Riss. The first form is used in the
instance of a sole beneficiary who actually delivers the will to the
clerk, and states only:
, 19
Estate of: [decedent1
The undersigned person(s) is hereby given notice that a will has been
filed in the Cabell County Clerk's office.
[signature of party delivering will1
[Vol. 98:687
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In the second, more common scenario, there are a number of ben-
eficiaries who are each entitled to actual notice under Cary. In this in-




You are hereby notified that on . 19___, the Will of the
above named estate was recorded in our office, and you are named as an
heir/beneficiary of this estate. If you have any questions please contact_,
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